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NOTE
DOES A HEALTHY PATIENT NEED A CURE?
A RESPONSE TO HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
PROPOSALS TO REFORM ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS OF HORIZONTAL
HOSPITAL MERGERS
INTRODUCTION
The past ten years have witnessed a significant number of horizontal
mergers' and other collaborative activity2 in the health care industry.3
"A horizontal merger is defined as a merger between firms engaged in similar lines of
production." Brian Golden, Note, The Evolution of Horizontal Mergers and the 1992 Merger
Guidelines, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 159, 159 n.4 (1993) (citations omitted).
2 Collaborative activities include acquisitions and joint ventures. Frederic J. Entin et al.,
Hospital Collaboration: The Needforan AppropriateAntitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
107, 114 (1994).
3 See Brian J. McCarthy & Toni Weinstein, Special Strategies Sidestep Legal, Regulatory
Obstacles To Health Care Mergers and Acquisitions, 11 No. 4 HEALTHSPAN 7, 7 (1994)
(describing mergers as "rampant among all segments of the health care industry"). The American
Hospital Association has advocated health care collaborations "to improve access and quality [of
health care services] and to reduce the precipitous rise of health care costs." Entin et al., supra
note 2, at 109; see Sandy Lutz, Let's Make a Deal: Healthcare Mergers, Acquisitions Take Place
at Dizzying Pace, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 19, 1994, at 47 ("More than 650 of the nation's
hospitals were involved in mergers or acquisitions in 1994, eclipsing the number of hospital deals
in recent years."); Erik Eckholm, Healing Process: A Special Report; While Congress Remains
Silent, Health Care Transforms Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at Al (highlighting
effectiveness of health care industry's actions to reduce costs and increase efficiency in face of
Congressional inaction on reform); Milt Freudenheim, Market Place; There May Be More
Hospital Mergers Before the Dust Clears, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1994, at D6 [hereinafter Before
the Dust Clears] (discussing recent mergers between National Medical Enterprises and American
Medical Holdings, and between Columbia/HCA Healthcare and Healthtrust); see also Joy Greene
& Sandy Lutz, Systems Post 4th Straight Year of Income Growth, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 23,
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Large proprietary hospital corporations are merging4 and acquiring
nonprofit hospitals with increasing frequency.' Several factors operate in
combination to encourage collaboration: (1) overcapacity resulting from
increased competition with managed care organizations; (2) technological
advances in health services; and (3) the desire of hospitals to reduce
dependency on federal funding and create additional sources of capital.6
In addition, the trend toward hospital combination has been attributed to the
shift in federal spending policy from support of hospital expansion to
control of health care costs.7
1994, at 36 (discussing 1993 as year of "merger mania" for hospitals); 1994 Mergers and
Acquisitions, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 19, 1994, at 48 (listing hospital mergers in United States
during 1994).
4 See, e.g., Before the Dust Clears, supra note 3, at D6 (discussing possible merger between
two largest proprietary hospital chains); Texas, Two Other AGS to Mull Columbia/HCA-
Healthtrust Merger, Hous. POST, Oct. 25, 1994, at C6 (describing review of major proprietary
hospital mergers by state attorneys general); Sallie Hofmeister. A $3.3 Billion Hospital Deal Is
Proposed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1994, at D1 (discussing major proprietary hospital mergers).
Of the approximately 5369 general acute-care hospitals in the United States in 1993, private
investors owned approximately 13.3%. NATIONAL MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, PRELIMINARY
PROSPECTUS, $100,000,000 NOTE OFFERING 56 (1995) [hereinafter NATIONAL MEDICAL
ENTERPRISES].
I See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, Hospitals Are Tempted but Wary as For-Profit Chains Woo
Them, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1995, at Al ("[Nonprofit hospitals] are eager to preserve their
identity and protect their mission. But they are also aware that to survive at all, they may have
to merge with other hospitals."); see also Sandy Lutz, Not-For-Profit Keeps Clout in N.D. Deal,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 9, 1995, at 8 (describing merger between for-profit Champion
Healthcare Corp.'s Heartland Medical Center and nonprofit Dakota Hospital); Thom Wilder,
Catholic Hospitals Brace for Mergers: Cleveland Deal Being Watched Closely, 3 Health Care
Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 45 (Oct. 9, 1995) (reporting first merger between nonprofit Catholic
hospital and investor-owned chain and discussing concerns of nonprofit community regarding
merger).
6 See Stephen W. Bernstein, Hospital Mergers, Acquisitions and Affiliations: The Anatomy
of Motivations, Models, Process and Legal Considerations, in HEALTH CARE LAW 1993, at 77,
77-78 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4428, 1993). Bernstein presents
additional factors which may explain the trend toward collaboration, id., including preparation
for federal health care reform lower occupancy levels due to technological advances, the desire
to reduce duplicate services, and the desire to promote community well-being. Id.; see also
Thomas M. Susman & David A. Martland. The Brave New World of Health Care: Hospital
Mergers and Joint Ventures in the 90s, 38 BOSTON B.J. 3, 3 (1994) (attributing hospital
collaboration to "[o]vercapacity, downward pressures on prices, the desire of large buyers to
obtain a full array of health care services from a single provider, and the specter of significant
health care reform legislation"). One commentator has argued that the hospital industry is a
"natural monopoly ... where the cost at which a single firm can produce a given product or
service to satisfy the entire market demand is less than the cost at which several competing firms
can produce the same product or service." Dayna B. Matthew, Doing What Comes Naturally:
Antitrust Law and Hospital Mergers, 31 Hous. L. REV. 813, 820 (1994).
1 See Entin et al., supra note 2, at 108-09. Federal legislation has had a strong impact on the
development of hospital markets in the United States. Id. at 139. The Lanham Act. Pub. L. No.
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This trend toward hospital collaboration has generated significant
criticism of antitrust policy in the hospital industry.8 Part I of this Note
will examine current antitrust law concerning horizontal hospital mergers,
with particular emphasis on the analysis used by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division
("DOJ"). Part II of this Note will examine hospital industry criticism of
current antitrust law, and the federal enforcement agencies' response to this
criticism. Finally, Part III of this Note will argue that current antitrust
law, as enforced by the FTC and the DOJ, is both necessary and sufficient-
ly flexible to encourage pro-competitive collaboration among hospitals.
I. ANALYSIS UNDER SECTION SEVEN OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Section Seven of the Clayton Antitrust Acte ("Section Seven")
prohibits horizontal mergers that "substantially ... lessen competition, or
77-137, §§ 202-03, 55 Stat. 361, 362-63 (1941), and the Hospital Survey and Construction Act
of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-725, ch. 958, 60 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 24 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 46 U.S.C., 48 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.), both
provided federal funding for hospital construction. Entin et al., supra note 2, at 139. Moreover,
Medicare and Medicaid sharply increased the amount of hospital spending financed with federal
funds. Id. However, "It]he Social Security Amendments of 1983, which implemented the
prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services, radically changed the operation
of hospitals by replacing the historic cost-based reimbursement with a fixed price system." Id.
at 142; see Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 601-07, 97 Stat. 65
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). Commentators suggest
that these changes in the federal funding system resulted in overcapacity which thereafter
provided motivation for hospital collaboration. Entin et al., supra note 2. at 142.
1 See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of antitrust laws); see
also Matthew, supra note 6, at 870 (concluding that current antitrust policy is inappropriate in
context of natural monopolies created by hospital markets); Susman & Martland, supra note 6,
at 3 ("The American Hospital Association and the American Medical Association have argued
forcefully that antitrust enforcement is counter-productive and chills potentially cost-saving
consolidations."); Entin et al., supra note 2, at 137 ("As the dominant player in hospital markets,
the federal government has a special responsibility to ensure that the antitrust laws are not used
to frustrate community-based efforts to promote beneficial hospital collaboration."); Richard A.
Feinstein, Health Care Mergers: FederalAntitrustLaw and Significant Trends, in HEALTH CARE
LANV 1993, at 9 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4428, 1993)
(discussing hospital industry challenges to application of traditional antitrust analysis to hospital
mergers). But see David L. Meyer & Charles F. Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not
Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 189 (1994) (showing that
despite current antitrust laws, only eight of 200 mergers since 1987 have been challenged);
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Statements of Enforcement Policy and
Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,152,
at 20,774 (Sept. 30, 1994) [hereinafter Policy Statements] (indicating that agency challenges to
hospital mergers are "relatively rare" and generally conclude within one month).
I Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1994)).
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* . . tend to create a monopoly.' To determine if a hospital merger
creates this prohibited adverse competitive effect, courts and commentators
have looked to the joint merger guidelines"' and the joint statements of
antitrust policy concerning the health care industry 2 first published by the
DOJ and the FTC in 1992.13 These enforcement standards are particular-
ly important given the deference accorded administrative decisions by the
courts. 4 Section Seven antitrust analysis requires consideration of the
following factors: the relevant product and geographic markets within
which the merging hospitals operate; market concentration; competitive
impact of the merger; and ownership structure and size of the merging
hospitals.
A. The Relevant Market in Hospital Mergers
Analysis of mergers under Section Seven begins with defining the
relevant market in which the mergers occur."' The relevant market
" 15 U.S.C. § 18; see Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986)
(identifying "ultimate issue" in Section Seven cases as whether challenged merger has potential
to "facilitate collusion"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
" Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines]. The 1992
Merger Guidelines marked the first joint effort of the FTC and DOJ to clarify enforcement
policies concerning Section Seven of the Clayton Act and Section One of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Id. The Guidelines were intended to deter mergers which would adversely affect
competition, encourage mergers which would increase competition, and enhance the predictability
of agency enforcement. Id. at 41,553.
12 See Policy Statements, supra note 8, at 20,774. "The Agencies' analysis of hospital
mergers follows the five steps set forth in the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines." Id.
"3 The DOJ and FTC have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the Clayton
Act. United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1282 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 920 (1990).
"4 See Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1385. When the FTC determines under the Clayton Act
that a merger should be prohibited because it creates the danger of collusion, the determination
will be upheld by federal courts if the FTC's conclusion is supported by "substantial evidence."
Id.; see also Ukiah Valley Medical Ctr. v. FTC, 911 F.2d 261,264 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
issuance of FTC complaint is not final and reviewable by courts because it does not "impose an
obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative
process") (quoting Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113
(1948)).
'1 "Determination of the relevant product and geographic markets is 'a necessary predicate'
to deciding whether a merger contravenes the Clayton Act." United States v. Marine Bancor-
poration, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974) (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957)). The 1992 Merger Guidelines provide:
A merger is unlikely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise
unless it significantly increases concentration and results in a concentrated market,
properly defined and measured. Mergers that either do not significantly increase
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includes a product or group of products sold by the merging entities and
the geographic area within which the products are sold.' 6
1. The Relevant Product Market
The product market is defined as the product or group of products for
which a price increase by a monopolist would be profitable due to
consumer unwillingness or inability to purchase alternative products.'7
concentration or do not result in a concentrated market ordinarily require no further
analysis.. . . Accordingly, for each product or service. . . of each merger firm, the
Agency seeks to define a market in which firms could effectively exercise market
power if they were able to coordinate their actions.
Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,554; see Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1284 (acknowledging
that key to determining effects of mergers on market concentration is correctly defining market
in which merger occurs); Owen S. Mudge, Jr. & Allan Gibofsky, The Developing Application
of Antitrust Laws to Hospital Mergers, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 355, 360 (1994) ("The first step in
evaluating a potential antitrust violation is to define the relevant market."); Susman & Martland,
supra note 6, at 3 ("The first, and often most important, step in analyzing a merger is to define
the relevant product and geographic market."). The relevant product and geographic market in
conjunction with a firm's calculated percentage of output in the relevant market are used to
determine the firm's market power, or power to control prices or exclude competition. Golden,
supra note 1, at 160-61. When a small number of suppliers comprise a high percentage of the
aggregate market share, it is easy for those suppliers to charge a price above competitive levels
without losing business. Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1283. In the context of antitrust law, generally,
the issue is not the pre-merger market power of the firms involved; rather it is the potential
market power resulting from the merger. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW 85 (1985). For a general discussion of the manner in which economies should
mold antitrust law, compare LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
1-17 (1977) (advocating, in accordance with populist school theory, that economics should play
limited role in antitrust law) with RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE (1976) (advocating, in accordance with Chicago school theory, that economics play
vital role in antitrust law).
6 The 1992 Merger Guidelines define the relevant market as:
[A] product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is produced or sold
such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation, that
was the only present and future producer or seller of those products in that area likely
would impose at least at a "small but significant and non-transitory" increase in price,
assuming the terms of sale of all other products are held constant.
Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,554; see FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d
1206, 1210-11 (1 th Cir. 1991) (defining relevant product and geographic markets for hospital
mergers); Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1284 (same); Mudge & Gibofsky, supra note 15, at 360 ("The
relevant market is comprised of the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market
' Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,554. If, however, alternative products are
attractive enough to induce consumers to purchase them when the monopolist raises prices or
lowers production levels, then the product market is drawn too narrowly. Id. at 41,555. If such
alternative products exist, the products should be added to the definition of the relevant product
market. Id.
This product market definition assumes, however, that the monopolist is not engaging in
price discrimination. Id. Because different buyers may be more or less likely to resort to alterna-
19951
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Disagreement exists, however, on whether the relevant product market for
hospital mergers is limited to services provided by inpatient acute-care
facilities"8 or includes the outpatient facilities with which inpatient acute-
care hospitals compete.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuits advocate the narrow definition. 9 In FTC v. University Health,
Inc.,2 the FTC sought to enjoin the asset acquisition of one nonprofit
hospital by another.2 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the Southern District
of Georgia's denial of the injunction.' The circuit court acknowledged
the district court's definition of the relevant product market as including
only acute-care inpatient facilities, as well as its conclusion that the post
tive products, the monopolist can identify the buyers less likely to resort to alternative products
and target price increases toward them. Id. Therefore, the relative sensitivity of the product
market to price increase must also be considered when defining the market. Merger Guidelines,
supra note 11, at 41,555.
Is An acute-care general hospital is characterized by a highly developed infrastructure,
extensive service base, sophisticated equipment, and skilled personnel. NATIONAL MEDICAL
ENTERPRISES, supra note 4. Non-acute care services typically include nursing homes, outpatient
clinics, social services and physician offices. See Jay Greene, Diversification, Take Two;
Hospitals Are Adding Non-Acute-Care Services to Broaden Their Marketability and Boost Their
Appeal to Healthcare Buyers, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 12, 1993, at 28 (including long-term
care, physical rehabilitation, ambulatory care, and physician-hospitaljoint ventures as typical non-
acute services). Many large for-profit hospital chains are venturing into the growing sub-acute-
care market as a cost efficient alternative to traditional hospital services. See John Burns,
Subacute Care Feeds Need to Diversify; Providers See Growing Market in the Middle Ground of
Healthcare, MOD. HEALTHCARE. Dec. 13, 1993, at 34 ("Subacute units house patients who no
longer require inpatient acute-care services yet need a higher level of care than is available in a
traditional skilled-nursing facilities or at home.").
19 See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1210-11 (adopting district court product market
definition which included only inpatient services by acute-care hospitals); Rockford, 898 F.2d at
1284 (limiting product market definition to "provision of inpatient services by acute-care
hospitals"); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1388 (7th Cir. 1986) (declining to
extend definition of product market to include outpatient services).
20 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
21 Id. at 1210. Under the proposed merger, University Health was to control 43% of the
relevant hospital market in Augusta, Georgia. Id. at 1211. Further, the remaining 57% of the
market would have been controlled by only three hospitals. Id. at 1210-11. In fact, the merger
would have taken one hospital out of the general acute-care market, thus leaving only four
hospitals serving that market. Id. at 1210.
' University Health, 938 F.2d at 1225-26. The court held that the FTC made a strong prima
facie showing that the proposed acquisition would substantially reduce competition and that
University Health failed to rebut this showing. Id. at 1224. The FTC demonstrated that the
acquisition would have left the relevant market highly concentrated with a substantial opportunity
for hospital collusion to undermine competitive behavior. Id. at 1219. Moreover. increased
market concentration in conjunction with Georgia's certificate-of-need law, posed a significant
threat to competition because there would be little opportunity for other firms to enter the market.
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merger market would be highly concentrated, but criticized the district
court's failure to grant the injunction to the FTC based on this analysis?23
The Seventh Circuit addressed the definition of "relevant product market"
in Hospital Corporation of America v. FTC.4 In Hospital Corp., the
largest proprietary hospital chain in the United States acquired two other
national proprietary hospital chains.' Before the acquisition, the buyer
owned only one hospital in Chattanooga, Tennessee.26 As a result of the
acquisition, however, the buyer gained ownership of two additional
hospitals in Chattanooga, as well as management contracts for two
others.27 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the FTC determination that the
merger violated Section Seven of the Clayton Act.' The court defined
the relevant product market narrowly, reasoning that, "although hospitals
increasingly are providing services on an out-patient basis, thus competing
with nonhospital providers of the same services[,] . . .most [inpatient]
hospital services cannot be provided by nonhospital providers."29
2 University Health, 938 F.2d at 1210-11. The Eleventh Circuit based this conclusion on the
belief that the proposed merger would allow hospitals in the Augusta market to increase prices
or reduce output of services without fear of competition from smaller acute-care providers. Id.
at 1219.
2 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987). The Seventh Circuit
also addressed this issue in United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
1 Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1383.
6 Id.
I Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1383-84. Hospital Corporation, therefore, owned or managed
five of the eleven hospitals in the relevant area after the acquisition. Id. at 1384. Later. Hospital
Corporation cancelled one of its newly acquired management contracts. Id. The Seventh Circuit
concluded that this type of postacquisition transaction need not be considered in determining the
effect of a merger on market concentration. Id.
I Hopsital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1385. The court reasoned that the FTC provided "substantial
evidence" that the acquisition was likely to create adverse competitive effects. Id. The Seventh
Circuit based its conclusion on two facts: (1) the merger increased Hospital Corporation's
Chattanooga market share from 14% to 26% in a market where the four largest hospitals
controlled 90% of the market; and (2) the pre-merger market share for the four largest hospitals
was 79%. Id. at 1384. In addition, the court relied on the fact that the acquisitions "reduced the
number of competing hospitals in Chattanooga from 11 to 7." Id. at 1389.
21 Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1388; see United Staes v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898
F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990). Rockford involved an action
brought by the United States to enjoin the merger of the two largest nonprofit hospitals in
Rockford, Illinois, a city of 140,000 people. Id. at 1280. Rockford had three large acute-care
hospitals: Rockford Memorial, SwedishAmerican Hospital, and St. Anthony Medical Center.
United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1292 (N.D. III. 1989), aff'd, 898
F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990). In 1987, SwedishAmerican and
Rockford Memorial proposed a merger which was to take place in 1988. Id. at 1252. After the
United States commenced an action in the Northern District of Illinois to enjoin the merger,
Rockford and SwedishAmerican agreed to refrain from further merger activity until after the
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The contrary view, however, was expressed by the United States
Distric Court for the Western District of Virginia in United States v.
Carilion Health Systems.30 In Carilion, the United States challenged the
merger of two nonprofit hospitals in Roanoke, Virginia. 3' The court
defined the relevant product market more broadly than did the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits by including outpatient facilities that compete with
hospitals providing outpatient services in addition to more traditional
inpatient services.32
The weight of authority supports the narrower product market
definition (limited to inpatient acute-care facilities) that was imposed by the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.33 Moreover, commentators suggest that
this narrow definition is more consonant with the policy of the enforcement
agencies.' Most importantly, however, the FTC appears to have adopted
resolution of the litigation. Id. The court concluded that the relevant product market was inpatient
services provided by acute-care hospitals. Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1284. In response to Rockford
Memorial's contention that the product market definition should include outpatient services
because such services are increasingly provided by acute-care hospitals, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that if a monopoly exists for inpatient acute-care services, it is irrelevant that there is
competition for other types of care. Id.
"' 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989).
3' Carillon, 707 F. Supp. at 841. Defendant Carilion Health Systems was a nonstock,
nonprofit holding company that owned Roanoke Memorial Hospital. Id. at 842. Also operating
in the area were defendant Community Hospital of Roanoke Valley and Lewis Gale Hospital
owned by Hospital Corporation of America. Id. The United States challenged the merger between
Roanoke Memorial and Community Hospital. Id. at 841-42. Each of the three hospitals in the
area provided significant outpatient care and varying degrees of inpatient acutecare. Id. at 843.
32 Carillon, 707 F. Supp. at 847. The court concluded that:
Based on the finding above that providers of outpatient services compete with providers
of inpatient services for the same patients in a significant number of cases, the court
concludes that the relevant service market for this case includes not only other inpatient
hospitals but also various outpatient clinics that treat medical problems for which
patients might otherwise have sought treatment in an inpatient hospital setting.
Id. But in determining that the merger did not restrain competition, the court focused on the fact
that the major competitor in the area was expected to put substantial pressure on the merged
hospitals as the number of patients in the market who were hospitalized continued to decline. Id.
at 848.
31 See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1206 (1 1th Cir. 1991); Rockford, 898
F.2d at 1284; Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1388; In re Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, slip op.
at 3 (FTC Apr. 1, 1994). But see Carillon, 707 F. Supp. at 847 (defining relevant product market
to include services from outpatient facilities with which inpatient acute-care hospitals compete).
3 See, e.g., Feinstein, supra note 8, at 9 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 325 (1962)). Feinstein concluded that:
[R]elevant market is a function not of the goods and services the merging entities
choose to provide, but of the goods and services available to serve reasonably similar
consumer needs. . . . [Bly acknowledging the importance of identifiable subgroups of
the provider's customers, the Rockford court's approach, like that of the Guidelines.
leaves room for the analysis to focus on particular, highly specialized services not
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this narrow product market definition.35
2. The Relevant Geographic Market
The relevant geographic market is defined as the area surrounding the
merged firms which is no larger than sufficient for the monopolist to find
price increases profitable given consumer tendency to seek lower price
suppliers when possible." In the context of hospital mergers, the relevant
geographic market can be determined using the Elzinga-Hogarty test.37
This test produces an appropriate geographic market by measuring both the
generally available from other similarly situated entities.
Id.
3 See In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 220-21 (1984) (employing narrow
definition and requiring American Medical to divest hospital in California); see also In re Hospi-
tal Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 466 (1985) (requiring divestiture of two hospitals in Ten-
nessee). In In re Hospital Corp., the issue of defining the relevant product market was not
directly before the Commission. The Commission stated, however, that:
In any case, it is clear from the evidence that the core and vast majority of an acute
care hospital's business is acute inpatientcare. Certainly, it is clear that anticompetitive
behavior by hospital firms could significantly lessen competition for hospital inpatients
that could not be defeated by competition from non-hospital outpatient providers. Our
analysis will hence proceed with primary reference to the cluster of services provided
to inpatients.
Id. (citations omitted). For subsequent disposition of this case, see Hospital Corp. of Am. v.
FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
1 Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,552. In a market where there is no price
discrimination, if the monopolist's price increase in a location would result in reduced sales, then
the geographic market should be enlarged to include the "next-best substitute for production at
the merging firm's location." Id. at 41,556. In determining the extent of a geographic market,
the Merger Guidelines consider:
(1) evidence that buyers have shifted or have considered shifting to relative changes in
price or other competitive variables:
(2) evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect of buyer substitution
between geographic locations in response to relative changes in price or other
competitive variables;
(3) the influence of downstream competition faced by buyers in their output markets;
and
(4) the timing and cost of switching suppliers.
Id. If the monopolist is able to target buyers in the geographic market that are less willing to
switch suppliers, and to raise prices only for those buyers, then appropriate additional geographic
locations should be considered to account for buyers who are not the target of price discrim-
ination. Id.; see also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963)
(determining that geographic market is "area of effective competition . . . in which the seller
operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies") (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)).
31 See Kenneth G. Elizinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market
Delineation Revisited: The Case of Coal, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1987); Kenneth G. Elizinga
& Thomas F. Hogary, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 18
ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973).
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percentage of patients who live in a given area and remain there for
inpatient hospital services, and the percentage of patients living in the area
who leave for inpatient hospital services.38  Generally, the relevant
geographic market in a hospital merger is defined as the area in which
seventy-five to ninety percent of residents seek hospitalization and in which
the same percentage of patients discharged from hospitals in the area
reside.39
In United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp. ,40 the Seventh Circuit
employed the "clearly erroneous" standard to choose between two
imperfect geographic market definitions.4' The defendant hospital offered
a broad market definition which included the ten counties surrounding
Rockford in northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin.42 The district court
defined the geographic market as only the county in which Rockford is
located and portions of several other counties; 3 eighty-seven percent of
31 See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1261-78 (N.D.
I11. 1989) (providing detailed analysis regarding use of Elzinga-Hogarty test), aff'd, 898 F.2d
1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990). In Rockford, the court found the Elzinga-
Hogarty test "a useful tool for eliminating certain geographic areas from consideration as relevant
markets." Id. at 1271; see also In re Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, slip. op. at 6 (FTC Apr.
1, 1994) (finding that "historical or current patterns of patient flows are valuable sources of infor-
mation in analyzing the question whether a hypothetical monopolist in a geographic area could
exercise power"). The Commission also determined, however, that "other evidence is equally
relevant." Id.; see Feinstein, supra note 8, at 11 (noting that "[i]n hospital merger cases, the
identification of the geographic market begins with patient origin data for hospitals in the relevant
firms' service area and those just outside the service area").
But see Hospital Corp., 106 F.T.C. at 472 (stating that "static" Elzinga-Hogarty analysis
was "incomplete"). Only after concluding that it would be "difficult" to find an appropriate
market did the court accept the proposed market, for lack of a better alternative. Id.; see also
United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1989) (characterizing
district court's market definition as "imperfect" but adopting it nonetheless as "less imperfect"
alternative under "clearly erroneous" standard of review). cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
3 Feinstein, supra note 8, at 11; see Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 1271 ("According to
economic literature. . . figures equal to, or greater than, 90% represent[] a 'strong market' while
a 75% figure represents a 'weak' market."). The Rockford Court, however, stated that this guide-
line "is of minimal utility since it suggests little more than that as the percentages increase, your
confidence in your market should also increase." Id. at 1272.
o 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
41 Id. at 1285.
42 Id. at 1284.
41 Id. The defendants employed the Elzinga-Hogarty test to define the relevant geographic
market. Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 1266; see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text
(discussing Elzinga-Hogarty test). The court concluded that "if adding certain areas or
competitors to the market does not appreciably increase at least one of [the Elzinga-Hogarty
factors], without decreasing the other, then that area should probably not be included in the
market." Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 1272. Because the defendants' geographic market definition
failed to meet this standard, the court determined that the defendants' market definition was
drawn too broadly. Id. at 1277; see also Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1284 (affirming district court
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the defendants' patients resided in this area.' The Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that the district court could have defined the geographic
market more aptly by including an additional hospital in Beloit, but
concluded that this shortcoming did not significantly alter market
concentration figures.45
The FTC employed similar patient flow analysis to define the relevant
geographic market in In re Hospital Corp. of America4 and In re
American Medical International, Inc.47 In Hospital Corp., the Commis-
sion concluded that patient flow analysis is important but static and must
be supplemented by analysis which considers the market effects of changes
in price and output.48 In In re American Medical International, Inc., the
Commission determined that American Medical's patient flow data
prepared for litigation was clearly less probative than Medicare and Medi-
definition of relevant geographic market).
44 Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1284.
45 The Seventh Circuit reasoned:
It is always possible to take pot shots at a market definition (we have just taken one),
and the defendants do so with vigor and panache. Their own proposal, however, is
ridiculous-a ten-county area in which it is assumed (without any evidence and
contrary to common sense) that Rockford residents, or third-party payors. will be
searching out small, obscure hospitals in remote rural areas if the prices charged by
the hospitals in Rockford rise above competitive levels.
Id. at 1285.
4 106 F.T.C. 361 (1985).
47 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984). In In re Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, slip op. at 3 (FTC Apr.
1, 1994), the FTC also used patient flow analysis in dismissing a complaint challenging the
merger of a 43-bed hospital with a 51-bed hospital in Ukiah, California. Id. at 2. At the time of
the merger in 1988, there were three hospitals operating in Ukiah: Ukiah Adventist Hospital (the
43-bed facility), Ukiah General Hospital (the 51-bed facility), and Mendocino Community
Hospital (a 56-bed facility). Id. As a result of the merger, Ukiah Valley Medical Center was
created, which operated as a 94-bed hospital at the two physically separate locations. Id. The
Commission held that the government failed to demonstrate a sufficiently narrow geographic
market to support its allegation that the merger would create adverse competitive effects. Id. at
9. The Commission reasoned that no evidence was offered to show that patients would not leave
the geographic market if the merging hospitals raised prices. Adventist Health, No. 9234, slip op.
at 9. Moreover, the Commission pointed out that the patient flow data did not support the
government's geographic market definition because the data demonstrated that only 74.57% of
residents did not seek hospital care outside the area. Id. at 7. The Commission also pointed out
that the merging hospitals expressed a desire in their business strategy plan to recover patients
from outside Ukiah through competition. Id. at 9. The Commission concluded that, assuming that
such patient recovery through competition was possible, loss of patients to hospitals outside Ukiah
was the likely result of anticompetitive conduct. Id. This premise led the Commission to include
in its definition of the relevant geographic market the hospitals outside Ukiah that could compete
for patients residing in Ukiah. Id.
Is Hospital Corp., 106 F.T.C. at 472. On the basis of this type of analysis, the Commission
concluded that the relevant geographic market was the Chattanooga urban area. Id.
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Cal data to the contrary.49 In each of these opinions, however, the FTC
noted that the relevant geographic market for hospital mergers is deter-
mined in large part by physician-admitting practices." This is true
because hospitals compete for physicians5' and because physicians play a
primary role in determining where their patients are admitted. 2
3. Market Concentration Analysis
After defining the relevant product and geographic markets, the firms
participating in the market and their market shares must be identified to
determine whether the merger enhances market concentration to the extent
of violating Section Seven of the Clayton Act. 3 Market concentration is
often measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"), which is
calculated by determining the sum of the squares of the market shares for
each firm in the relevant market. 4  The higher the HHI, the greater the
" American Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 196. The Commission pointed out that American Medical
failed to address several of the administrative findings that it had initially challenged before the
Commission. Id. In particular, the Commission noted that American Medical failed to dispute the
geographic barriers, such as patient convenience, limited mobility, and location of admitting
physicians, all of which called for a narrow definition of the geographic market. Id.
' See Hospital Corp., 106 F.T.C. at 467; American Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 197; see also
Mark J. Horoshak, Antitrust and Health: Policy and Enforcement. in HEALTH CARE LAW 1993,
at 6 (PLI Coin. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4428, 1993) ("Geographic market
is determined by looking at various factors, including physician admitting practice . . . ").
"I American Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 197 (noting that "[h]ospitals engage in very rigorous
competition for their physicians").
52 Id. ("[I]t is the physician who is responsible for admitting patients to hospitals, and
hospitals compete for physicians in order to increase admissions."). Thus, "physician preference,
rather than patient choice, decides what hospital will be utilized." Hospital Corp., 106 F.T.C.
at 467; see also, Horoshak, supra note 50, at 4 (discussing physician referral power). But see
Feinstein, supra note 8, at 23 (discussing "Stark Bill" which prohibits physicians from making
referrals for any services in which they have any financial interest).
13 See Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,557 ("Market concentration is a function of
the number of firms in a market and their respective market shares."). Market shares can be
expressed in dollar amounts or physical terms by measuring sales, shipments, or production. Id.
When measurements are expressed in physical terms, capacity and reserves can also be used as
indicators. Id. Concentration levels are calculated by applying the market share data to determine
the pre-merger and post-merger concentration levels in the relevant market. Id. at 41.558.
Id. at 41,557-58; see FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206. 1211 n. 12 (1 1th Cir.
1991) ("The most prominent method of measuring market concentration is the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index (HHI)."); United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251.
1279 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990). In
Rockford, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois adopted the HHI
standard for measuring market concentration when it stated:
The HHI attempts to quantify a market's concentration by summing the squares of the
individual market shares of all the firms in the market. This formula reflects the
distribution of market shares between firms and gives proportionately greater weight
to the market shares of the larger firms, which likely accords with their relative
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concentration of the relevant market.55
Both University Health and Rockford provide examples of courts using
HHI figures to evaluate the competitive impact of hospital mergers. In
University Health, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's denial
of the FTC's application for a preliminary injunction to prevent a hospital
merger in a small market.56 This disposition was in part based on the
court's finding that the proposed merger would increase the HHI by 630,
raising the index to approximately 3200. 7  In Rockford, the Northern
District of Illinois calculated market concentration by examining the
number of hospital beds, inpatient admissions, and inpatient days in the
market.58 Each of these bases indicated that the merger took place in an
already highly concentrated market and generated an increase in the HHI
of between 2000 and 3000.19 The court granted a permanent injunction
against the merger because it would have resulted in one hospital
importance in any anti-competitive interaction.
Id.; see also Feinstein, supra note 8, at 13 ("HHI figures relevant to merger analysis are (a) post-
merger HHI for the relevant market, and (b) change in concentration evidenced by the difference
between the post-merger HHI and the premerger HHI."); cf. University Health, 938 F.2d at 1211
n.12 (discussing four-firm concentration ratio, another method used to evaluate market
concentration).
I See Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,558. An HHI of 10,000 indicates a perfect
monopoly. Id. When the post-merger market HHI is below 1000, the market is considered
unconcentrated and the merger is considered unlikely to cause adverse competitive effects. Id.
In such cases there will ordinarily be no challenge to the merger. Id. When the post-merger
market HHI is between 1000 and 1800, the market is considered moderately concentrated. Id. In
such a market, if the HHI increases by less than 100, then the merger is also unlikely to have
adverse competitive effects and ordinarily will not be challenged. Merger Guidelines, supra note
11, at 41,558. If the HHI increases by more than 100, however, then the merger raises significant
antitrust concerns. Id. When the post-merger market HHI is greater than 1800, the market is
considered highly concentrated. Id. In such a market, if the HHI increases by less than 50, it does
not raise competitive concerns. Id. If, however, the HHI increases by more than 50, then the
merger raises significant antitrust concerns. Id. See generally Gloma J. Bazzoli et al., Federal
Antitrust Merger Enforcement Standards: A Good Fit for the Hospital Industry, 20 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 137 (1995) (discussing application of HHI in detail).
"6 938 F.2d at 1226. The court reasoned that a decision not to issue the injunction would
frustrate the FTC's ability to safeguard competition and protect the public from anticompetitive
behavior. Id. at 1225.
1 Id. at 1211 n.12. The court specifically stated that "any merger that increases a market's
HHI by over 100, to a post-merger level over 1000, raises antitrust concerns." Id. The premise
behind these concerns is that a concentrated market will yield a higher HHI and an unconcen-
trated market will yield a lower number. See Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 1279.
s Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 1279-80. The court explained that it did not matter which of
these three bases was used to calculate the HHI, since they all resulted in similar figures. Id. at
1280.
59 Id. The court also noted that the concentration of the relevant market nearly doubled as a
result of the merger. Id.; cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 (1963)
(labelling increase of only 33% in concentration as "significant").
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controlling seventy percent of the market.60
B. Adverse Competitive Impact of Hospital Mergers
Market share and concentration data are merely the beginning of an
analysis of the competitive impact of horizontal mergers. 6' Given a post-
merger HHIl which indicates potential adverse competitive impact in a
moderately or highly concentrated market, the exact effect of the merger
on the relevant market must be determined.62 Mergers may diminish
competition by enabling firms in the relevant market to engage in
coordinated interaction that harms consumers. 63  Alternatively, mergers
may diminish competition without enhancing potential coordination because
merging firms may find it profitable to elevate prices after the merger and
reduce output without coordination.' The FTC and the DOJ will
challenge mergers that increase the likelihood of this type of price and
output control. 65
A merger is unlikely to create anticompetitive market power if entry
into the market is sufficiently easy so that market participants could not
profitably maintain prices above pre-merger levels. 66 Entry is easy in this
I Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 1292. The court found that it was "simply impossible to ignore
the language in [Philadelphia Nat'l Bank] that a 'merger which produces a firm controlling an
undue percentage share of the relevant market . . . is so inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially that it must be enjoined . . . .'" Id. at 1291 (citation omitted).
61 See Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied.
481 U.S. 1038 (1987). In this case the Seventh Circuit stated:
[Tihe ultimate issue is whether the challenged acquisition is likely to facilitate
collusion. In this perspective the acquisition of a competitor has no economic
significance in itself; the worry is that it may enable the acquiring firm to cooperate
(or cooperate better) with other leading competitors on reducing or limiting output,
thereby pushing up the market price.
Id.; see Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,558 ("The smaller the percentage of total supply
that a firm controls, the more severely it must restrict its own output in order to produce a given
price increase, and the less likely it is that an output restriction will be profitable.").
I In addition to market share and concentration ratios, the FTC will "assess the other market
factors that pertain to competitive effects" before deciding whether to challenge a merger. Merger
Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,558. But see Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 1291-92 (using only
market share and concentration data to conclude that merger would result in firm controlling
undue percentage share of relevant market).
I Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,558; see Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1386
(discussing concern that mergers will lead to cooperation with leading competitors in reducing
or limiting output thereby driving up market price).
See Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,560.
See, e.g., Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1386 (explaining that economic concept of
competition requires FTC to challenge mergers that are likely to harm consumers).
I Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,561; see also Gregory Vistnes, Hospital Mergers
and Antitrust Enforcement, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y L. 175, 187 (1995) ("If entry is likely,
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context if it is timely, likely, and sufficient in magnitude, character, and
scope to counteract the adverse effects of the merger.67 State certificate-
of-need laws restricting entry and expansion into hospital markets,
however, make it unlikely that ease of entry will justify an otherwise anti-
competitive hospital merger.6 Such laws restrict entry into and expansion
of hospital markets as a means of controlling the quality and price of
hospital services.69
Mergers that create efficiencies resulting in lower prices to consumers
are likely to survive Section Seven scrutiny.' Efficiency claims,
then postmerger price increases may be reversed or hospitals may abstain from increasing price
so as not to induce entry.").
I Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,560; see also Vistnes, supra note 66, at 187
(stating that "such entry is generally very expensive, very slow, financially imprudent even if
prices increase, and is often restricted by certificate of need laws").
13 Certain states require a certificate of need for the establishment of acute-care hospitals,
expansion of bed capacity, significant capital outlays, and changes in services provided. In re
Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 489 (1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
1 See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir.)
("Regulatory limitations on entry into the hospital industry increase the propensity to collude by
preventing (or at least delaying and increasing the cost of) entry by new competitors to take
advantage of an increase in prices."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990); Hospital Corp., 807
F.2d at 1387 (noting that Tennessee's certificate-of-need law reduced ability of existing hospitals
to expand output and reduced ability of new hospitals to enter market in ways that counter
adverse competitive effects of merger).
In North Carolina ex rel. Edminsten v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 722 F.2d 59, 68 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985), the Fourth Circuit held that a hospital merger
approved under state certificate-of-need laws enacted pursuant to the National Health Planning
and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1994). was protected from
enforcement agency challenge by an implied antitrust exemption. The court interpreted the
Supreme Court's holding in National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross. 452
U.S. 378 (1981), as allowing an antitrust exemption when a state regulatory review and approval
process exists. Id. But see Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1285 (citing National Gerimedical for
proposition that regulatory limitations on market entry do not create implied antitrust exemption);
see also infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing state action immunity doctrine).
10 Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,562. Mergers are attractive to both firms and
society because of the efficiencies created by their resulting collaboration. Id. Antitrust law is
designed to prohibit only those mergers which create efficiencies in ways that "present a signifi-
cant danger to competition." Id.; see also Policy Statements, supra note 8, at 20,774 ("Antitrust
challenges to hospital mergers are relatively rare."). The Department of Justice and the FTC have
challenged only a handful of the hundreds of hospital mergers that have taken place since 1987.
Id.
Commentators seem to agree that hospital mergers create economies of scale, both by
eliminating duplicate services and overcapacity, and by enabling hospitals to provide a broader
package of acute-care services. See, e.g., Matthew, supra note 6, at 839-45 (discussing studies
which show that as competing hospitals merge, overall industry costs decrease): McCarthy &
Weinstein, supra note 3, at 7 (concluding that hospital mergers designed to gain market share and
cost efficiencies represent important option for struggling hospitals).
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however, will be rejected if the merging parties can achieve equivalent or
comparable savings through means that threaten less competitive harm.7'
Similarly, a merger is unlikely to enhance market power to the extent of
violating Section Seven if imminent failure of one of the merging firms
would cause the assets of that firm to exit the market if the merger did not
occur.
7 2
C. Ownership Structure and Size of Merging Hospitals
The ownership structure of merging hospitals may influence their
treatment under Section Seven. For instance, state-owned hospitals are
exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the state action immunity doctrine.73
When a state entity seeks antitrust immunity, it must demonstrate that: (1)
it is a political subdivision of the state; (2) through statutes, the state
generally authorizes the political subdivision to perform the challenged
action; and (3) through statutes, the state has clearly articulated a state
policy authorizing anticompetitive conduct.74
", Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,552: see FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938
F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[A] defendant who seeks to overcome a presumption that a
proposed acquisition would substantially lessen competition must demonstrate that the intended
acquisition would result in significant economies and that these economies ultimately would
benefit competition . . . ."); see also In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 219
(1984) (rejecting efficiency claim because American Medical failed to demonstrate that substantial
efficiencies could not be achieved within comparable period of time through combination which
posed less threat of competitive harm).
72 Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,558; see University Health, 938 F.2d at 1221
(recognizing that financial weakness of acquired firm only precludes FTC challenge when
weakness cannot be cured by competitive means and indicates that merger would be unlikely to
have adverse competitive effects); Janet L. McDavid, Antitrust Analysis of Hospital Mergers. in
HEALTH CARE REFORM AND ANTITRUST, 369 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 694, 1994) (stating that failing firm defense is "strictly construed by the antitrust agencies").
73 See FTC v. Hospital Bd. of Directors, 38 F.3d 1184, 1187-88 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (discussing
requirements for government entity to qualify for antitrust immunity); Askew v. DCH Regional
Health Care Auth., 995 F.2d 1033, 1037 (1 th Cir.) (discussing two prong-test for distinguishing
immunity from antitrust liability), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 603 (1993); see also Sarah S. Vance.
Immunity for State-Sanctioned Provider CollaborationAfterTicor, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 409 (1994)
(surveying state legislative attempts to create antitrust immunity for private providers in hospital
industry).
74 Hospital Bd. of Directors, 38 F.3d at 1187-88; see also Askeiv, 995 F.2d at 1037 ("[Wlhen
a local governmental entity seeks immunity from antitrust liability, it must show that it is a
political subdivision of the state and that the challenged conduct is authorized under a 'clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed' policy of the state." (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39 (1985))).
Similarly, when a state attempts to immunize private conduct from antitrust scrutiny it must
(1) clearly articulate through legislation the affirmative policy of permitting anticompetitive
conduct, and (2) actively supervise the private conduct that occurs pursuant to that policy.
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). The
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In FTC v. Hospital Board of Directors,75 the Florida Legislature
created a nonprofit publicly owned organization to establish and manage a
public hospital for Lee County.76 The Florida Legislature later extended
the organization's power by allowing it to operate additional hospitals in
the county.77 When the organization sought to acquire a private hospital,
the FTC challenged the proposed merger as a violation of Section
Seven." The Eleventh Circuit held that, because anticompetitive effects
were foreseeable by the Florida Legislature when it allowed the organiza-
tion to purchase other hospitals, the state action doctrine immunized the
organization from federal antitrust laws.79
Supreme Court has looked disfavorably upon the application of the state action immunity doctrine
to private conduct. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992). This disfavor
manifested itself in the requirement that state supervision be exercised in practice and not merely
provided for by statute. Id. The Eleventh Circuit in Askew, however, held that the active state
supervision requirement does not apply to municipalities or political subdivisions because there
is little danger that they will engage in anticompetitive conduct. Askew, 995 F.2d at 1037. For
a comprehensive discussion of state legislative efforts to immunize private collaborative conduct
in the hospital industry from antitrust scrutiny, see Vance, supra note 73, at 416-31.
75 38 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1994).
76 Id. at 1186. The organization was created in 1963, when there was only one hospital in
Lee County. Id. at 1192. Pursuant to the legislation, the organization acquired the hospital,
thereby creating a monopoly in the county. Id.
" Id.
73 Hospital Bd. of Directors, 38 F.3d at 1192.
11 Id. The Eleventh Circuit stated that "[t]he Supreme Court and this Circuit have rejected
the concept that a clear articulation requires the state to state explicitly that it expects
anticompetitive conduct to result from legislation. Instead, a clear articulation merely requires that
anticompetitive conduct is the foreseeable result of the legislation." Id. at 1188 (citations omitted).
Prior to Hospital Bd. of Directors, the Eleventh Circuit dealt with the state action immunity
doctrine in Askew v. DCH Regional Health Care Auth., 995 F.2d 1033 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 603 (1993). In Askew, the Alabama Legislature enacted a law providing for the
creation of public health care authorities with the power to acquire and operate public health care
facilities. Id. at 1034. Aiming to provide new financing options for indigent and reduced care
patients, the Alabama Legislature conferred broad powers upon health care authorities, including
authorization "[t]o create, establish, acquire, operate or support subsidiaries and affiliates, either
for profit or nonprofit, to assist such authority in fulfilling its purposes.. . ." Id. at 1035; ALA.
CODE § 22-21-358(4) (1990); see ALA. CODE § 22-21-312 (1982). Private plaintiffs sued under
federal antitrust law to enjoin a health care authority's acquisition of a privately owned acute-care
hospital. Askew, 995 F.2d at 1035. The Eleventh Circuit held that the proposed acquisition was
protected from federal antitrust challenge under the state action immunity doctrine. Id. at 1041.
The Eleventh Circuit found that any health care authority incorporated under the Alabama Health
Care Authorities Act was a political subdivision of the state. Id. at 1038-39. The Alabama Act
authorized a health care authority "[t]o exercise all powers granted hereunder in such manner as
it may determine to be consistent with the purposes of this article, notwithstanding that as a
consequence of such exercise of such powers it engages in activities that may be deemed 'anti-
competitive' within the contemplation of the antitrust laws of the state or of the United States.
. . . " ALA. CODE § 22-21-318(a)(31) (1982). Because DCH was a political subdivision of the
state acting consistently with its authorization and because the Alabama statute made specific
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Nonprofit hospital corporations may also require special treatment
under Section Seven. There is a split of authority regarding whether
nonprofit hospitals fall under the FTC's jurisdiction to enjoin mergers
under Section Seven when the merger is accomplished through asset
acquisition. 8° While the contention that the FTC has jurisdiction to enjoin
anti-competitive asset acquisitions by nonprofit hospitals seems to be the
better reasoned approach, the issue is still unresolved.
8
'
While the ownership structure of merging hospitals dictates their
treatment under Section Seven, the size of the merging firms can also be
important. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
19 7 6 ,
2 when either of the merging firms is engaged in commerce, and
when either has assets or annual net sales of more than $10,000,000 and
the other has assets or annual net sales of more than $100,000,000, the
parties must file pre-merger notification with the FTC and abstain from
reference to the legislature's anticipation of anticompetitive conduct, the court concluded that the
state action immunity doctrine protected the health care authority. Askew, 995 F.2d at 1039-41.
1 Compare FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1lth Cir. 1991) (holding
that because nonprofit hospitals are not exempt from FTC Clayton Act jurisdiction under Section
Eleven, nonprofit hospitals are subject to FTC jurisdiction for enforcement of Section Seven
regarding asset acquisitions) and United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278,
1280 (7th Cir.) (reasoning in dictum that nonprofit merger is subject to Section Seven when
understood to refer to Section Eleven of Clayton Act), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990) with
United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 841 n.1 (W.D. Va.) (holding that FTC
Section Seven jurisdiction over nonprofit hospitals is precluded by Federal Trade Commission
Act), aff'd, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989). In University Health, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that because regulation of nonprofit hospitals is not expressly granted to another federal agency
in Section Eleven, nonprofit hospital asset acquisitions fall under the FTC's Section Seven
jurisdiction. University Health, 938 F.2d at 1214-15. The Seventh Circuit also promoted the
granting of authority over nonprofit acquisition to the FTC under Sections Seven and Eleven,
despite the court's inability to base its holding on the Clayton Act due to the government's failure
to proffer the argument. Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1280. The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand,
affirmed the reasoning of the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia that
the FTC does not have jurisdiction over nonprofit asset acquisitions because the Federal Trade
Commission Act confers no such jurisdiction. Carilion, 707 F. Supp. at 841 n.1.
81 See, e.g., Mudge & Gibofsky, supra note 15, at 377 (explaining that Rockford appears
more valuable because it provides more complete analysis of issue). The Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits' focus on the legislative purpose of Sections Seven and Eleven of the Clayton Act seems
to be the better reasoned approach when compared to the cursory treatment of the issue by the
Western District of Virginia. Compare University Health, 938 F.2d at 1213-15 and Rockford. 898
F.2d at 1280-81 with Carillon, 707 F. Supp. at 841 n.l. That the Fourth Circuit affirmed
Carillon with an unpublished opinion, see United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 892 F.2d 1042
(4th Cir. 1989), further undermines the precedential value of the district court's rational. See
Mudge & Gibofsky, supra note 15, at 377.
8 Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1390 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(1994)).
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further merger activity until the lapse of a prescribed waiting period. 3
In addition, where merging hospitals have over the previous three years an
average of fewer than 100 licensed beds and an average daily in-patient
census of fewer than 40 patients, the hospitals fall into a "safety zone" in
which the FTC and the DOJ will not challenge the merger. 4 This safety
zone applies absent extraordinary circumstances, but does not apply to
hospitals less than five years old.8
II. PUBLIC POLICY AND ANTITRUST LAW IN THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
Given the overcapacity in the hospital industry that has developed over
8 Section 18a(a) provides:
Except as exempted pursuant to subsection (c) ... , no person shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, any voting securities or assets of any other person, unless both persons
(or in the case of a tender offer, the acquiring person) file notification pursuant to rules
under subsection (d)(1) ... and the waiting period described in subsection (b)(1) has
expired, if-
(1) the acquiring person, or the person whose voting securities or assets are being
acquired, is engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce;
(2)(A) any voting securities or assets of a person engaged in manufacturing which
has annual net sales or total assets of $10,000,000 or more are being acquired by
any person which has total assets or annual net sales of $100.000,000 or more;
(B) any voting securities or assets of a person not engaged in manufacturing
which has total assets of $10,000,000 or more are being acquired by any person
which has total assets or annual net sales of $100,000,000 or more; or
(C) any voting securities or assets of a person with annual net sales or total assets
of $100,000,000 or more are being acquired by any person with total assets or
annual net sales of $10,000,000 or more; and
(3) as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person would hold-
(A) 15 per centum or more of the voting securities or assets of the acquired
person, or
(B) an aggregate total amount of the voting securities and assets of the acquired
person in excess of $15,000,000.
In the case of a tender offer, the person whose voting securities are sought to be
acquired by a person required to file notification under this subsection shall file
notification pursuant to rules under subsection (d). ...
15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (1994).
Subsection (c) of Section 18(a) lists exempt transactions including acquisitions of goods and
realty in the ordinary course of business, acquisitions of non-voting securities, and transfers from
federal and state agencies. Id. § 18a(c) (1994).
8 Policy Statements, supra note 8, at 20,774. The agencies recognize that such hospitals are
likely to be the only ones in the relevant market and compete little with other area hospitals.
Thus, a merger is not likely to substantially reduce competition. Id. Also, many such mergers
involve rural hospitals with collaboration being their only opportunity to realize some of the cost-
saving efficiencies of larger hospitals.
9 Id.
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the last 30 years,86 the concurrent inflation of health care costs,87 and
competition from managed care organizations,88 members of the hospital
industry are seeking to cut cost and enhance their competitive positions by
consolidating. 89  This trend has generated controversy concerning the
antitrust treatment of hospital mergers.'
A. Hospital Industry Criticism of Current Antitrust Law
Members of the hospital industry assert that federal antitrust laws
present an obstacle to the necessary restructuring of the health care
industry.9' With an industry shift toward outpatient care,92 hospitals are
confronted with significant overcapacity in facilities that are costly to
maintain.93 The American Hospital Association ("AHA") contends that
collaboration provides an efficient means of reducing overcapacity and the
cost of needlessly duplicative services. 94 The AHA further argues that the
8 See Susman & Martland, supra note 6, at 3 (identifying overcapacity as motivation for
hospital collaboration); Bernstein, supra note 6, at 78 (discussing low occupancy levels as factor
driving hospitals to collaborate).
' See Entin et al., supra note 2, at 108-09 (noting that health care costs have "continued to
rise faster than the rate of inflation over the last three decades"): see also supra note 7 (discussing
fixed-price government reimbursement under prospective payment system instituted under 1983
Amendments to Social Security Act).
I See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 77 (identifying competition from managed-care providers
as motivation for hospital collaboration).
' See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (discussing current trend toward hospital
collaboration).
90 See Matthew, supra note 6, at 814-15 (arguing that hospital industry deserves special
antitrust treatment because it performs "atypically under competitive market conditions"); Entin
et al., supra note 2, at 110 ("The antitrust laws, as currently enforced, are inappropriately
inhibiting the rational restructuring of the health care system through collaborative efforts.");
Susman & Martland, supra note 6, at 3 ("The American Hospital Association and American
Medical Association have argued forcefully that antitrust enforcement is counter-productive and
chills potentially cost-saving consolidations. Both have called for special antitrust exemptions for
health care mergers and joint activities."). But see Meyer & Rule, supra note 8. at 171 (arguing
that current federal antitrust law is sufficiently flexible to allow health care collaboration designed
to reduce costs and increase efficiency, and that immunity from antitrust law is unnecessary to
attain these objectives).
91 See Susman & Martland, supra note 6, at 3 (presenting medical association arguments
against antitrust laws).
' See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 77-78 ("[Hlospitals are feeling the pressure of lower
occupancy levels and are hurrying to develop or convert existing structures to outpatient facili-
ties.").
" See supra notes 6, 86, 87 and accompanying text (discussing overcapacity and rising health
care costs).
94 AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS'N, NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM: REFINING AND
ADVANCING AND VISION 11 (1992) [hereinafter AMERICAN HOSPITALS ASS'N]; see Entin et al.,
supra note 2, at 110; Susman & Martland, supra note 6, at 3; see also Matthew, supra note 6,
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reduction of overcapacity and duplicate costs is unlikely through the normal
market incentives that antitrust law strives to maintain95 because the third
party payor system desensitizes the hospital industry to market incen-
tives, 96 and because hospitals are forced to invest in underutilized
technology to prevent physicians from choosing to work at better equipped
facilities. 97 These arguments have lead many in the hospital industry to
conclude that antitrust law should be relaxed in the health care industry to
encourage this type of collaboration, 98 or in any event, be made more
predictable to reduce the prohibitive costs associated with FTC investiga-
tions of hospital mergers.99
B. The Response to Industry Criticism
The response to the hospital industry's criticism of antitrust law
centers around the argument that promoting competition is the most
effective method of protecting health care consumers."° Federal enforce-
at 815 (analyzing hospital mergers under "natural monopoly theory").
95 AMERICAN HOSPITALS ASS'N, supra note 94, at 11; see Entin et al., supra note 2. at 109-
10 (arguing that market incentives promoted by current antitrust law are insufficient to foster
necessary restructuring of hospital industry); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (prohibiting contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994) (prohibiting acquisitions
that reduce competition or tend to create monopoly).
- See Entin et al., supra note 2, at 123 ("In hospital markets, most individual consumers,
including those who are beneficiaries of public programs, are insulated from market prices by
third-party insurance."); Matthew, supra note 6, at 848 ("Hospitals have largely been relieved
from price competition because the consumer of health services-the patient-has not been the
direct purchaser of health services and therefore did not bear the economic cost of his or her
health care.").
9 See Entin et al., supra note 2, at 124 (stating that hospitals compete for physicians by
offering state-of-the art equipment); Matthew, supra note 6, at 848 ("Hospitals purchase bigger,
fancier technologies in order to attract and retain the most sophisticated physicians.").
I See Entin et al., supra note 2, at 137 (arguing that antitrust law should be changed so as
not to frustrate "efforts to promote beneficial hospital collaboration"); Matthew, supra note 6,
at 871 (concluding that antitrust law should be reformed to promote economies of scale generated
by hospital mergers).
I See Entin et al., supra note 2, at 137 (arguing that federal antitrust policy sends mixed
signals to hospital industry concerning what collaborative conduct violates antitrust law); Mudge
& Gibofsky, supra note 15, at 384 (concluding that decisional law should more clearly articulate
.standards by which hospital mergers will be judged"); Susman & Martland, supra note 6, at 3
("[l]f the federal enforcement agencies wanted to eliminate uncertainty about what conduct would
or would not raise antitrust concern, they have failed.").
100 See, e.g., Meyer & Rule, supra note 8, at 171 ("[Slound antitrust policy, and the system
of free-enterprise competition it reflects, provide the most reliable means to ensure the emergence
of the sort of marketplace innovations, including those involving collaboration, that can minimize
health care costs."). In her statement before the Senate Finance Committee. Mary Lou Steptoe,
Acting Director of the FTC Bureau of Competition, stated:
At their core, the proposed exemptions for physicians and hospitals may be based on
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ment agencies argue that current antitrust policy is sufficiently flexible to
accommodate efficient collaboration in the hospital industry.' Further-
more, because relatively few hospital mergers have been challenged in
proportion to the enormous number of mergers which have recently
occurred,102  the agencies claim that antitrust impediments to such
collaboration are more perceived than real.l°3 The enforcement agencies
have arguably advanced competition in the health care industry by tearing
down professional ethics standards that once restricted competition and by
eradicating conspiracies between providers to limit third party payor cost
containment efforts." Finally, it has been suggested that the benefit of
a fact-intensive standard for judging adverse competitive effects outweighs
the need for greater predictability in antitrust law's application to hospital
mergers. 10
questionable arguments about the nature of competition in health care markets and how
antitrust law applies to physicians and hospitals. One argument is that due to market
imperfections, competition in health care does not work to contain costs and ensure
quality. The other argument is that antitrust law is not flexible enough to deal with
markets, such as many health care markets, that may not resemble perfect competition.
In our view, however, the record of antitrust enforcement in the health care field shows
that competition is important to containing costs and ensuring quality, and that antitrust
enforcement is flexible enough to prevent harmful conduct without interfering with
efficient joint conduct that benefits consumers.
Antitrust Law Enforcement and Health Care Markets: Hearings Before the Senate Finance
Committee, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1994) [hereinafter Steptoe Finance Committee Statement]
(statement of Mary Lou Steptoe, Acting Director, FTC Bureau of Competition).
101 Id.; Feinstein, supra note 8, at 20.
' See Policy Statements, supra note 8, at 20,774 ("Antitrust challenges to hospital mergers
are relatively rare. Of the hundreds of hospital mergers in the United States since 1987. the
Agencies have challenged only a handful, and in several cases sought relief only as to part of the
transaction."); see also HEALTH, EDUCATION, & HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION, GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. B-252783, HEALTH CARE-FEDERAL AND STATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
CONCERNING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 5 [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (stating that of 397
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act filings between 1981 and 1993, only 15 filings were challenged or
withdrawn).
"o See Meyer & Rule, supra note 8, at 174 ("[T]he impediments to legitimate cooperation
by health care field participants, aimed at achieving the most efficient possible market outcomes.
are more imagined than real."); see also Christine A. Varney, New Directions at the FTC:
Efficiency Justifications in Hospital Mergers and Vertical Integration Concerns, Remarks Before
the Healthcare Antitrust Forum, 1995 WL 255938, at *1 (F.T.C.) (May 2, 1995) (explaining that
because of overcapacity and difficulty of entry in hospital markets, FTC will consider, in depth,
efficiency claims of merging hospitals before challenging merger).
104 See Feinstein, supra note 8, at 22-23.
1o See supra part I.A. (discussing standards applied to relevant market definition and
concentration data for hospital mergers); Meyer & Rule, supra note 8, at 197-200.
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III. ANTITRUST LAW SHOULD NoT BE RELAXED IN THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
Evidence seems to support the contention that antitrust protection is
necessary in the hospital industry. An initial study has shown that merged
hospitals typically do not pass on efficiency gains to consumers in the form
of lower prices for health services.0 6  Rather, these hospitals typically
increase profits in direct relation to increases in market share, passing on
such profits only to those consumers who participate in business managed
care organizations or coalitions that enhance their bargaining positions.'°7
If proven true over time, these statistics appear to undermine the argument
against antitrust enforcement in the health care industry by highlighting the
danger of collaboration in moderately or highly concentrated markets. This
premise is reflected in the efficiency defense contemplated by the
enforcement agencies which only applies when the economies generated by
the merger are passed on to the consumer in the form of lower prices. 108
Moreover, it appears that current antitrust law is sufficiently flexible
to allow pro-competitive hospital collaboration.0 9 While proprietary
hospitals continue to merge at a staggering rate," 0 the FTC and the DOJ
have challenged relatively few hospital mergers."' In addition, the FTC
106 Jay Greene, Merger Monopolies Research Shows Merging Hospitals May Be Promising
Employers More Than They Can Deliver, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 5, 1994, at 38 ("[O]n
average .... 18 merged hospitals increased their prices a total of 9% two years after a merger,
compared with a 1% price hike the year before the merger.")
17 Id.
103 Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at 41,562 (recognizing efficiency defense may be
difficult to demonstrate). It is submitted that, as a policy matter, efficiency should only preclude
antitrust analysis when savings benefit consumers. To the extent such benefits are not realized,
antitrust scrutiny appears necessary to determine if combination produces anticompetitive effects.
See Steptoe Finance Committee Statement, supra note 100, at 5.
11 See Meyer & Rule, supra note 8, at 171 ("[F]ederal antitrust laws, as presently written
and sensibly enforced, provide a great deal of flexibility for private collaborative efforts aimed
at achieving more efficient and less costly health care services."); supra notes 100, 101, and 103
and accompanying text. An example of this flexibility is the FTC practice of allowing a merger
to go forward while requiring the acquiring firm to divest only the assets the acquisition of which
raised competitive concerns. See Janet D. Steiger, Remarks Before the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association, 1995 WL 155943, at *4 (F.T.C.) (Apr. 7, 1995) (describing example
of such merger agreement in pharmaceutical industry); Mary Lou Steptoe, Current Issues in
Health Care Antitrust: Boycotts, Mergers, and Provider Networks, Remarks Before the American
Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting, 1995 WL 150724, at *6 (F.T.C.) (Apr.
5, 1995) (stating Commission's objective is to distinguish "those elements of the transaction that
would have a detrimental effect on competition from those elements that would not").
tO See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
m See supra note 102 and accompanying text; Steptoe Finance Committee Statement, supra
note 100, at 7.
1995]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and the DOJ have been less likely to challenge joint ventures for local
sharing of expensive medical equipment when such ventures reduce cost to
consumers. 112  Finally, both the FTC and the DOJ have expressed a
willingness to render advisory opinions to firms which are contemplating
merger activity, but which are uncertain about their status under antitrust
law. 113
CONCLUSION
The first step in antitrust analysis of hospital mergers is to define the
relevant market in which the merger occurs. The relevant market is most
aptly defined as including only inpatient acute-care hospital services in an
area where 75 to 90 percent of the residents seek such acute care and
where 75 to 90 percent of patients reside. Once the relevant market is
identified, market concentration analysis is used to determine if the merger
raises competitive concerns to the extent of violating Section Seven of the
Clayton Act. There are several factors, however, which may preclude
antitrust challenge even of mergers that otherwise raise competitive
concerns: efficiencies created by the merger; prevention of failing hospitals
from exiting the market; ease of entry into the market given state
certificate-of-need laws; the size of the merging hospitals; and their
ownership structures.
Indications that merged hospitals pass to consumers cost savings
gained from enhanced market power only when forced to do so highlight
the typical market incentives motivating hospital collaboration. Indeed,
such evidence demonstrates the risks of relaxing antitrust policy in the
health care industry. Moreover, given the infrequency with which the
enforcement agencies challenge hospital mergers, their willingness to
render pre-merger advice, and the existence of alternative forms of
332 Policy Statements, supra note 8, at 20,775-79; see GAO REPORT. supra note 102, at 5
("Neither DOJ nor FTC has ever challenged a hospital joint venture."); Meyer & Rule, supra
note 8, at 192-94 ("[E]nforcers have long encouraged parties to consider joint ventures as a
precompetitive alternative to outright mergers."); Steptoe Finance Committee Statement. supra
note 100, at 8; Robert J. Enders, An Introduction to Special Antitrust Issues in Health Care
Provider Joint Ventures, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 805, 809 (1993) (finding that joint ventures between
hospitals often arise as less risky antitrust alternative to complete merger or acquisition).
"1 Policy Statements, supra note 8, at 20,774 (stating that hospitals considering mergers
desiring certainty regarding antitrust laws may take advantage of DOJ's review program or FTC's
advisory opinion); see Gail Kursh, Recent Activities of the Antitrust Division in the Health Care
Field, Address Before the American Bar Association, 1995 WL 217865, at *2 (D.O.J.) (Apr. 5,
1995) ("The expedited business review program [provided for in the 1993 Joint Policy Statement]
has been very successful. During the past two years, the Division issued 18 health care business
review letters, and we have almost an equal number currently under consideration.").
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collaboration which pose less of a threat to competition, current antitrust,
law as enforced by the DOJ and the FTC, is flexible enough to allow pro-
competitive combination in the hospital industry.
William M. Stelwagon

